Lecture Abstract

The “hard problem of consciousness” and the “explanatory gap” remain central challenges in the scientific study of consciousness, despite recent advances in cognitive science and neuroscience. This paper explores how the four core principles of Madhyamaka Buddhist philosophy—impermanence (anityā), nonself (anātman), emptiness (śūnyatā), and dependent origination (pratītyasamutpadā)—can help reframe these issues and bridge the divide between first-person phenomenology and third-person explanation.

By critically examining the dualistic assumptions underlying the notion of phenomenal experience as involving irreducible, non-physical qualia, and drawing on Madhyamaka arguments against the inherent existence of persons and phenomena, the paper proposes an alternative “middle way” between reductive physicalism and Cartesian dualism.

The paper argues that integrating Madhyamaka philosophical insights with the empirical methods of embodied and enactive cognitive science can lead to a new paradigm in the scientific study of consciousness, one that bridges first-person and third-person perspectives without reducing one to the other. While challenges remain in articulating and applying this integral view, the dialogue between Madhyamaka philosophy and contemporary debates in the science of consciousness can shed fresh light on the puzzles of subjectivity and open up new avenues for theoretical and empirical investigation.